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“Shocks the conscience,” is a legal phrase occasionally used in the United 
States immigration system. It is used to justify a decision, i.e., the facts of this 
case “shocks” a judge’s conscience and influences the decision. Sometimes the 
decisions are appealed, on the basis that the judge misunderstood the facts or 
had too sensitive of a stomach. This small legal phrase is an effective 
representation and introduction into the world of the asylum system in the 
United States: a court system where immigrants attempt to gain “refugee” status 
to protect their human rights after fleeing their country of origin. The issues in 
this system are many, but the most fundamental problem is the contradictory 
nature of having a system designed to find truth (by excluding the 
“undeserving” immigrant) that allows complete subjectivity and the biases 
associated with it to be the basis of life or death decision-making. The paradox of 
this system became quite clear after 9/11.  
This paradox became quite evident in one immigration case that occurred 
inconveniently just six days after the Twin Towers were destroyed. Takky 
Zubeda was a young Congolese woman who, despite suffering from sexual 
slavery and the murder of her family, was denied asylum but granted 
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Convention Against Torture (which has far fewer benefits attached to it). In the 
judge’s opinion, she was not a credible witness, and her suffering was not due to 
an immutable characteristic but was generalizable to the entire population of her 
country. In denying her asylum, while granting her CAT, the judge invalidated 
her suffering while the system prolonged that suffering by keeping Zubeda in 
prison for four years.  
 This case is an accurate representation not only of the asylum system in a 
post-9/11 context, but also of the supranational structures of the human rights 
system and how that particular system has developed since 1948. The only way 
to fully understand this system is through such a text that blends both a case 
study and a larger theoretical examination while acknowledging the plasticity of 
identity categories. This is the goal of this thesis: to provide such an analysis.  
Some authors have attempted to tackle a comprehensive analysis of this 
system, but have been exceedingly limited by their presentation of human rights 
as a static and transcendent concept (accepting the United Nations documents as 
essentially good and beyond historical critique). For many years, historians shied 
away from histories that attempted to tackle what human rights meant in 
history. The two most prominent voices, Lynn Hunt and Samuel Moyn, both fail 
to fully acknowledge the role marginalized identities play in the history of 
human rights. Sexism, racism, and anti-Semitism are mentioned in passing, 
		
5	
instead of being fundamental threads in their arguments. Even when they do 
mention these identity categories, they fail to historicize them and consequently 
use anachronistic understandings of race and gender to define the past. Because 
of this, their histories focus more on the invented “universal human” accessing 
his rights, but the universal human always is a coded representation of the most 
powerful group: white men1.  
Lynn Hunt’s book Inventing Human Rights: A History 2is an example of this 
“universal human” trope in human rights history. She begins her analysis in the 
1700s and ends in 1948 (the year the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was 
proclaimed). This book was the beginning of a historical discussion of human 
rights post 9/11, and in many ways shaped the discussion by examining human 
rights as an intellectual concept invented around the 1700s. Hunt’s book is 
driven by the contradictory nature of human rights, which she defines as 
universal (even though these rights aren’t applicable everywhere and at every 
point in human history), self-evident (even though not all human beings know 
what they are), and inherent to human beings (even though the majority of 
human beings have had their rights violated). Hunt attempts to answer the 
paradoxical nature of rights by stating, “you know the meaning of human rights 
																																																								
1 Richard Dyer, White. (London: Routledge, 1997), 61. 




because you feel distressed when they are violated. The truths of human rights 
might be paradoxical in this sense, but they are nonetheless self-evident.”3 
Effectively answering her foundational, philosophical questions about human 
rights with circular logic, while producing a refugee in her book that is 
inherently white, European, heterosexual, and male.  
 Other histories barely question the concept of human rights at all, and 
place it outside of social construction through sweeping analyzes covering 
decades of history. Books like The History of Human Rights by Micheline R. Ishay4 
attempt to locate human rights in ancient civilizations to present, and do not 
provide a background social context that would explain how people thought, 
acted, and felt in regards to human rights during various time periods. This text 
cements contemporary understandings of rights, oppression, and identity as 
superior and true by not analyzing their plasticity or the diversity of experiences. 
Human rights thus become a nebulous ideology anachronistically projected onto 
all of human history, a perfect utopic concept resting in the wings of time.  
Samuel Moyn is a harsh critic of this conceptualization of human rights, 
criticizing historians for producing a modern “utopia” myth: writing human 
																																																								
3 Hunt , Inventing Human Rights: A History, 214 4	Micheline Ishay, The History of Human Rights: From Ancient Times to the Globalization Era, 




rights as if it were a transcendent concept of universal human empathy and 
understanding. In Moyn’s two books on the subject, The Last Utopia and Human 
Rights and The Uses of History5, he examines early to modern human rights history 
and argues that the concept only gained popularity during the Carter 
administration because of Carter’s revolutionary dedication to implementing 
human rights in his policies. Moyn condemns his fellow historians on their 
analysis of key historical human rights texts (such as United Nations documents, 
political speeches, or legal texts). He critically notes their failure to historicize, 
their fallacious conclusions, or the way in which they analyze human rights as a 
static concept. Surprisingly, in his own analysis he glosses over oppression in his 
discussion of human rights. Identity categories like gender or race are either 
static or unmentioned in his writing. In attempting to cover such a large portion 
of history were others have failed, unfortunately Moyn repeats their mistakes.  
 In contrast to the books attempting to provide comprehensive histories, 
several authors have examined the specifics of human rights and the internal 
mechanisms of the human rights system. These texts are largely sociological, 
although some label their work as a history. For example, sociologist David 
																																																								5	Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2010).	
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Haines wrote Safe Haven: A History of Refugees in America6: in it, he provides a 
broad overview of the general experience of a refugee in the United States, using 
Vietnamese refugees in Richmond, Virginia as a case study to demonstrate his 
points. This book provides important theoretical perspectives about the 
experiences of refugees, but it lacks historical context: one example is Haines 
description of the refugee’s experience of assimilation in Richmond, but he fails 
to contextual this narrative in the greater historical tradition of immigrant 
assimilation in the United States. Similarly, Carol Bohmer and Amy Shuman 
wrote a sociological book, Rejecting Refugees: Political Asylum in the 21st Century7, 
that blended critical legal theory with a collection of interviews with refugees, 
but this book was very much a product of contemporary understandings. This 
lack of historicization makes these texts less comprehensible and incomplete 
from a historian’s perspective. Their writing in the sociological present hinders 
readers from developing an understanding of how certain asylum categories 
have changed over time. This is essentially a lack of reflexivity: the authors’ lack 
of awareness of their place in relation to the text, to attempt to prevent a biased 
perspective. 	
																																																								6	David W. Haines Safe Haven?: A History of Refugees in America (Sterling, VA: Kumarian Press, 
2010).  	7	Carol Bohmer and Amy Shuman, Rejecting Refugees: Political Asylum in the 21st Century (London: 
Routledge, 2008).  
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 Sara L. McKinnon’s Gendered Asylum: Race and Violence in U.S. Law and 
Politics8 most closely resembles this thesis, in that it is an analysis of U.S. 
immigration history that uses race and gender as sites of analysis. McKinnon 
interweaves several case studies in each chapter to demonstrate the way in 
which “gender” became a category of persecution in U.S. asylum law. 
McKinnon’s background is in communications with no formal training in history 
or historical analysis, which becomes very evident in her book. The historical 
background she provides for her arguments are just dates and significant events, 
and she fails to historicize identity categories that shaped the policies she’s 
analyzing. Although it follows a time line, gender is not examined as the fluid 
category it is that shifts over time.  
 This thesis is a synthesis of these texts, in that it benefits from the 
perspectives each offers while attempting to avoid the pitfalls. By providing a 
historical summary alongside Zubeda’s personal testimony, an overview and 
dissection of the foundations of the international human rights system, and 
finally a close reading of a single court case in contrast to the facts provided 
previously, this thesis threads together different levels of analysis to present a 
comprehensive examination of the United States asylum system that is anchored 																																																								8	Sara L. McKinnon, Gendered Asylum: Race and Violence in U.S. Law and Politic (Urbana: University 




in the early 2000s which produces a multidimensional understanding of the 
system highlighting the effects of these structures and the localized actors within 
the system. I believe that this conceptualization is the only way to fully 
understand the human rights system in the United States and its inherent 
contradictions.   
To provide the full story at the very beginning, chapter 1 provides 
specifics of Takky Zubeda’s experiences and an overview of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo’s history. This chapter’s importance becomes clear in 
relation to chapter 3: in her court case, Zubeda’s story was examined and 
scrutinized, and then grossly misrepresented. Chapter 1 sets up the events 
leading up to Zubeda’s flight, which are connected to the DRC’s history of war 
and gender violence, to provide later contrast to claims made in court.  
The second chapter is a deep reading into the foundational documents of 
the international human rights system: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, and finally, The Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Each text 
added to the evolving discourse of human rights, so the history behind them is 
equally important in providing context to Zubeda’s case. The UN produced a 
paradigm implicit in these definitions, in which ambiguity and narrow 
definitions allowed governments to adopt each document to each country’s own 
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standards and levels of political acceptability. In the context of the United States 
immigration laws, this meant a dependence on subjective assessments to make 
decisions, and thus the continued proliferation of oppressive structures through 
systematic ratification of discrimination, especially against people from Africa 
and other “non-white” nations.  
 Finally, chapter 3 surveys the specifics of the case itself: close readings of 
each text presented in the court demonstrate the ways in which actors of the 
United States asylum system were subjective in their judgments, as allowed by 
the international human rights system. These biased conclusions become a 
paradigm through which the case exists. This means that at each level of legal 
proceedings Zubeda’s story is represented through the personal opinions of 
Judge William Durling, the first immigration judge to hear her case. This case 
study ties the international into the local, and reveals the power that is given to 
sovereign states to redefine human rights.  
 
 
1. History and Testimony: The Facts Behind the Case 
   
The United States asylum system, remaining true to the United States 
immigration paradigm9, has a self-legitimizing façade: being a vital institution 
that divides the “deserving” from the “undeserving” through logic and empirical 																																																								9	The set of laws pertaining to U.S.’s management of immigrants through border control, interior 
enforcement, and a court system.			
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truth. The system produces and reifies these fabricated persons in the process of 
sorting them. This happens in two ways, by validating some forms of human 
suffering while ignoring others (by inventing traits associated with “real” 
suffering) and by invoking a false sense of scarcity by putting a cap on how 
many people a country can “save” by allowing them to migrate to the U.S. Entry 
Denied: Controlling Sexuality At The Border by Eithne Luibheid examines a similar 
process in the prevention of immigration through providing a close case study of 
the United States’ ban on lesbian immigration from 1965 to 1990. Luibhéid argues 
that immigration officers used physical traits associated with lesbianism (smaller 
breasts, more masculine features) to then expel them, even though there is no 
evidence that such markers exist. The invented lesbian physicality is the perfect 
analogy to the invention of the “true refugee”, and the processes still occurring in 
the system today where the goal seems to be to find the “real” victim of human 
rights violations (the “real” rape victim, the “true” torture victim, etc.) and the 
“deceitful” immigrant attempting to cheat the system10.  
The use of evidence, testimony, and the (false) detection of lies created a 
performance of a quest for truth in the Zubeda case. To best demonstrate the 
liberties taken with the presentations of facts, this chapter provides a 
																																																								10	Eithne Luibhéid, Entry Denied: Controlling Sexulity at the Border (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2002), 3 	
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comprehensive background into the Democratic Republic of the Congo and a 
narrative account of Zubeda’s experiences, told through the notes of my 
interview with her11. This narration is the result of a set of unstructured 
interviews with Zubeda, collected over a series of phone conversations and a 
single in-person interview which lasted six hours on March 25th, as well as a 
culmination of all the pieces of information presented during her court case. This 
chapter sets up a contrast by providing the background circumstances of 
Zubeda’s case. These are the facts that led Zubeda to request asylum, and the 
same facts that the United States immigration system used to deny her that 
protection.  
The Democratic Republic of the Congo’s history defies a concise and 
complete summary. Most histories begin with an analysis of the colonization of 
the DRC by King Leopold II of Belgium12. King Leopold and, later, the Belgian 
government wrung the DRC for its natural resources by forcing Congolese 
people into grueling and dangerous labor with little profit of the indigenous 
inhabitants. This serfdom continued until the middle of the 20th century; the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo was massively profitable for Belgium. They 
																																																								
11 Zubeda did not wish to be recorded.  
12 For more information on the early colonization of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and 
the atrocities committed by King Leopold II and the Belgium government, see King Leopold’s 
Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa by Adam Hochschild. See also, The 




secured their investment through the continuation of colonization, all while 
actively denying Congolese education or advancement. After a series of strikes 
and riots, Belgium granted independence to a nation that they had almost 
produced to fail: little education, few work opportunities, and no government 
structure was the Belgian legacy13.  
Joseph-Désiré Mobutu (later known as Mobutu Sese Seko) came to power 
with the help of Belgium in 1965. The first democratically elected leader, Patrice 
Lumumba, was overthrown by Mobutu (with the help of the CIA) and 
assassinated, leaving Mobutu in power for 32 years after. Zubeda was born 
during Mobutu’s reign, and left just prior to his ouster (1997) and eventual death 
in exile months later. Over the course of Mobutu’s term, extreme political unrest 
and violence was the rule of the day: dissent was exterminated, but ethnic 
conflict, particularly from Rwanda, slowly plunged the DRC into gruesome and 
horrific war14.  
On April 6th, 1994, Rwandan president Juvénal Habyarimana (who was 
ethnically Hutu) died after his plane was attacked and crashed near Kigali 
International Airport. Many blamed the Rwandan Patriot Front (RPF) and its 
																																																								
13 Jane Freedman, and Jane L. Parpart, Gender, Violence and Politics in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, (Taylor and Francis, 2016), 5 




leader and now current president Paul Kagame for the attack, because they were 
Tutsis attempted to usurp power from Hutus through an ongoing civil war. This 
assassination was symptomatic of prior ethnic tensions, but the act itself created 
an intense escalation of those tensions as Hutus began to massacre Tutsis and 
moderate Hutus. This eventually resulted in the genocide of an estimated 800,000 
people. The civil war occurring in the neighboring Rwanda deeply affected the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo as two million fleeing Hutus sought refuge 
particularly in Eastern Congo after the genocide. Kagame wanted these Hutus to 
stand trial and take blame for the Rwandan Genocide, and as a result the conflict 
continued across the Congolese border from refugee camps. These camps turned 





Zubeda was born in South Kivu on November 14th, 1974. She lived through the 
aftereffects of a brutal civil war, which affected her life until her eventual flight.     
During our interviews, Zubeda looked happy when remembering her 
family; she described them as very loving and everyone getting along well. She 
told me her father was Muslim and her mother was Christian; their relationship 
was equal and she never saw them fight or her mother get hurt. Her father 
would go fishing and sell his catch for money, while her mother stayed at home 
with the children. Zubeda was the middle child of three, with an older brother 
and younger sister. They all went to school, although Zubeda at times disliked 																																																								15	"Almost 50 years on, UN still struggles in Congo." Congolese Action Youth Platform Blog. 




going. She told me a story where she went to her aunt one morning complaining 
that she had a toothache and couldn’t go to school. Her tooth did actually ache 
but she really just wanted to miss a day of classes. Zubeda’s aunt, to her delight, 
told her she didn’t have to go. Before she could celebrate her day off, however, 
her aunt took her to the doctor to have her tooth pulled. She laughed recalling 
this memory, and told me she hadn’t really ever told anyone these stories. They 
certainly hadn’t been a part of the court case, because any mention of happiness 
in her life would have marred the effect needed for a judge to rule her a “perfect 
victim”.   
Zubeda had an arranged marriage on February 6th, 1999 to Ndume 
Ibochwa, He had been from the same town as Zubeda, and remembered her. He 
fled the DRC for the United States a few years prior to Zubeda, and called his 
parents one day to ask if they could help him find a wife. He said he couldn’t 
find any in the US, and they responded to him that there were many beautiful 
women still in the DRC that he could marry. He especially asked if Zubeda was 
still single; soon, they were married in a wedding ceremony in neighboring 
Tanzania (Ibochwa wouldn’t be able to return to the U.S. if he visited the DRC 
due to specific immigration laws, so the wedding couldn’t be there). Zubeda 
showed me pictures of the wedding; she wore a wedding dress Ndume had 
brought from America which had a full skirted bottom with an off the shoulder 
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bodice, and white flower puffs covering it. She took one last photo from the 
album to show me a rarity: a photo of her mother. We sat silently as we looked.  
 After the wedding, Zubeda followed custom and moved in with her in 
laws. She felt understandable apprehension as she worried about fitting in and 
being accepted into the family. Ndume returned to the United States to start the 
process of helping his wife immigrate, and Zubeda waited. Phone calls were 
difficult and expensive, so they rarely spoke. Zubeda was also separated from 
her family; her in laws lived outside of South Kivu, so she wasn’t able to be with 
them as much as she used to be. 
After living with her husband’s family for a while, Zubeda received a 
horrifying phone call. Her mother had been attacked by soldiers and gang raped. 
She had sustained injuries from the assault, so Zubeda immediately traveled 
back to South Kivu to help her family. They were unsure if the soldiers were 
government or rebel; Zubeda felt that her family was neutral in this war but she 
often wondered if her father participated politically unbeknownst to her family.  
Both sides had a “with us or against us” mentality but she still was confused by 
the specific targeting of her family. She knew that men in the DRC tended to be 
more reserved and did not feel the need to be open with their families, so 
perhaps her father was active in some way. She told me that people in the DRC 
didn’t really talk about politics because when they did they were severely 
		
19	
punished. Political opinions were repressed under Mobutu, and one person 
openly expressing dissent could endanger their entire family. The family 
considered their recourse for the shocking assault. Her father discussed going to 
a human rights organization for assistance. Before he could, however, the 
soldiers came back. 
It is important to understand these violent acts in relation to the political 
climate in the DRC; these were not random acts of cruelty. There was purpose, 
intention, and a great sociopolitical meaning behind these assaults. War and 
gender-based violence are intricately linked in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo16. The use of rape is not an unintended consequence of this turmoil, like 
shrapnel, but instead it a site of conflict. Rape holds specific social meaning in 
war; it “ruins” the woman, humiliates the men who could not protect her, and 
reaffirms the masculinity of the rapist(s)17. Especially due to the ethnic tension, 
the taboo of miscegenation adds further symbolic weight to the act of rape, as it 
becomes a way to “damage” or “weaken” an ethnic group.18 In her 2001 court 
case, the Judge ruled that Zubeda’s rape was an unfortunate but random 
occurrence; she was merely at the wrong place at the wrong time, instead of 																																																								
16 Human Rights Watch, “Soldiers Who Rape, Commanders Who Condone: Sexual Violence and 
Military Reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” 16 July 2009, 1-56432-510-5, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4a5efe262.html [accessed 9 May 2017] 
17 Maria Eriksson Baz and Maria Stern, Sexual Violence As a Weapon of War?: Perceptions, 
Prescriptions, Problems in the Congo and Beyond (London: Zed Books, 2013). 
18 Freedman, Gender, Violence and Politics, 69. 	
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being specifically and intentionally persecuted because of her gender and ethnic 
identity. That ruling is contradicted by the very nature of rape in the DRC during 
this time period19, and the facts of the case itself. These were soldiers who chose 
to target this family twice by raping and killing the women, and decapitating the 
men before burning all their possessions. These actions connect with the systemic 
use of rape in the DRC, are persecutory in nature.  
Zubeda did not know if the soldiers were rebels or from the government, 
but rape was used on both sides of the war in the same way. The soldiers broke 
into her family’s home with machetes, and tied up her father and brother. They 
gang-raped Zubeda as her relatives were forced to watch, before the men 
decapitated the male members and trapped her mother and sister in the home as 
they set it ablaze. Zubeda was dragged out of the home to be taken as a prisoner. 
The men climbed into a military vehicle that had supports on the back for a tarp 
covering. They drove for several miles into a dense forest, eventually reaching 
their encampment. 
Zubeda described the base as a large one-story structure. She assumed it 
to be an abandoned house that the soldiers had found or taken over, because it 
looked too old and less like a military compound. She was forced into a room 
with several women, and only let out to perform tasks, eat, or use the bathroom 																																																								19	Baz,	Sexual Violence As a Weapon of War, 42 	
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that was a small outhouse a ways away from the base in the forest. The room she 
was kept in didn’t have lighting, so she was unable to tell how many other 
people, soldiers or prisoners, were in the camp. She did know that among the 
women she was kept with, she was the youngest. Most were in their forties and 
fifties, while she was in her twenties. Although she wasn’t exactly chained up in 
the compound, Zubeda said that because any village or town was too far to walk 
to, and the soldiers had vehicles and guns, escape was incredibly dangerous. 
Escape was also discouraged because the soldiers had murdered whole families 
of the women who were kept prisoner, so no one was looking for them and there 
was no home for them outside of the camp.  
Zubeda and four other women decided to risk it anyway. One woman 
was more familiar with the area, so during dinner one night when they were 
allowed to go together to the rest room, they fled on foot through the forest. 
Because the base’s location was unknown to Zubeda, the forest she fled from 
remains a mystery. These forests had a variety of dangerous wildlife: venomous 
snakes, gorillas, and elephants. Zubeda told me that she never once considered 
the animals though: she was too afraid of the people who could recapture her.  
The five women, after running through the night, finally came upon Lake 
Tanganyika, the second largest and deepest lake in the world. They found a 
canoe near by, and began the long trek across to Tanzania. The lake at some 
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points is more than 40 miles wide, and without a map or compass, traveling in 
the dark, it may have taken the women five or more hours to paddle across. 
After canoeing through the night, the group was taken in by a near by Christian 
church who fed them and gave them a place to stay. During prayers one day, a 
woman, hearing Zubeda’s story, gave her twenty dollars and her passport and 
told her to go to the United States. Zubeda described this as perhaps one of the 
biggest mistakes of her life.  
She left Tanzania in 2000, and arrived at the Newark International airport 
a week before Christmas with only one hundred dollars and someone else’s 
passport. When asked the reason for her visit, fearfully she said she was visiting 
her brother and attending a bible school. She must have been exhausted; her feet 
were touching solid ground for the first time in 18 hours. She had recently fled 
for her life from the rebel camp, running on foot, not knowing where she was or 
where to find safety. She had to row across the deepest lake in Africa before 
finding someone who would offer her help. It’s hard to imagine what it felt like 
to sit down for 18 hours after such a trek. When pressed, she admitted that she 
was seeking asylum, and promptly she was placed in a cell awaiting an 
interview with an asylum officer. She waited, from December 16th 2000, until 
February 1st 2001. This was a full six weeks until she could even tell her story. 
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The asylum officer found her to be credible20, but the INS appealed the decision 
to court. This was the first big step in her proceedings, which lead her to stand in 
front of Judge Durling on September 18th, just over a week since the Twin 
Towers had burned down on September 11, 2001.  
Judge Durling ruled that she was incredible, or not to be believed. He 
thought she was lying about her past persecutions: the rapes, the murder of her 
family, her capture. He did rule that she shouldn’t be deported for fear of being 
tortured on her return, although this ruling came with no additional rights and 
the constant fear of being deported there after. This decision was appealed by the 
INS to a higher court, arguing that Durling was too lenient in his decision, 
especially if she was incredible. At the Board of Immigration Appeals, the board 
ruled that because she had been deemed a liar, it was most likely untrue that she 
would be tortured upon her return and thus should be deported. Zubeda’s 
lawyers appealed that decision. The Third Circuit court then sent it all the way 
back to Judge Durling, who essentially reinstated his first decision. This 
confusing process all relied on assumptions originally made by Durling about 
the facts presented in this chapter, assumptions that are contradictory and at 
times even illogical. All this is allowed by the international human rights 




allow them cultural fluidity (the ability to make subjective judgments based on 
current social ideology). The system is structured in a way that allows judges to 
pick and choose how they want to apply the laws, with the ability to change their 
interpretations based on the current political discourse of the moment. This puts 
asylees in particular peril because judges unequally apply the law over time, and 
can discriminate at will. After 9/11, the United States government used that 
leeway to begin an anti-immigrant crusade.  
2. A System of Loopholes 
 
 This chapter provides a historical context to the human rights system by 
looking at three principal documents that the United Nations produced. Each 
text illuminates the United Nation’s production of a purportedly universal and 
comprehensive summary of all essential rights for humane conditions. However, 
these texts remain restrictive, ethnocentric, and ineffectual. Later United States 
immigration laws reflect this framework, and expound upon the issues inherent 
in the framework, which can be seen in the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(signed into law in 1965, with provisions added in 2002), and the Immigration 
Judge’s Benchbook21, a text provided to judges by the INS that provides advice 
and relevant legal articles to assist them in their decisions. These texts are the 




foundation of the asylum system of the United There is a distinctive pattern in 
the composition of human rights texts that provide openings for sovereign states’ 
interpretations, particularly in the definitions of rights. Essentially, the authors 
either provide too much detail or too little when defining rights, which either 
allows states to make up their own details or renders the definition ineffectual 
due to its restrictions. These “disproportionate definitions” allows and effectively 
encourages the subjectivity and cultural biases intrinsic to the US asylum system. 
This is a supranational institution with no physical power of its own; thus, the 
only way the United Nations can exist is if it is beneficial and non-threatening to 
the world powers, like the United States.  
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
The United Nations, the primary structure of the international human 
rights system22, officiated the discourse of human rights with the creation of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948. It contains 30 articles, 
outlining the ideal human condition and how sovereign states should protect the 
rights associated with that condition. This foundational text begins the rhetorical 
discourse that covertly allows sovereign states more power: it does so by making 																																																								22	As I explained in the introduction, this system consists of nongovernmental (and thus 
considered “non-partial”) organizations like the United Nations, and are populated by countries 
who see their membership in this system as a commitment to the human rights laid out by those 
organizations. This a contradiction in and of itself since China, Russia, the US etc. have 
historically violated human rights either of their citizens or citizens of other countries, but remain 
the bulwark of the UN Security Council.	
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large claims about its impact, claiming that it is a universal and comprehensive 
text when it actually is quite limited; its ethnocentrism, its now-obsolete 
conceptualization, and the restrictive definitions for each of its articles limit their 
efficiency by giving sovereign states the power of interpretation and application.   
The UN represents the history of the document as a result of human 
astonishment and subsequent compassion in the face of atrocities: 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was adopted by the 
UN General Assembly on 10 December 1948, was the result of the 
experience of the Second World War. With the end of that war, and the 
creation of the United Nations, the international community vowed never 
again to allow atrocities like those of that conflict happen again.23 
 
Samuel Moyn disputes this narrative however, arguing instead that human 
rights were actually a development of a Nazi project: national welfarism24 with 
an emphasis of personal freedoms as one major distinction. The most definitive 
nail in the coffin of this Holocaust-response account of human rights is that there 
is no record of anyone discussing the Holocaust during the creation of the 
UDHR, save for one author who wrote of “barbarous acts” that Moyn postulates 
was the only Jewish man present for the creation of the declaration, Rene Cassin. 
This origin myth is an important part of contemporary understandings of the 
																																																								
23 "History of the Document." United Nations. Accessed April 10, 2017. 
http://www.un.org/en/sections/universal-declaration/history-document/. 
24 An ideology supporting the welfare state, a paradigm in which the government has the power 
to determine and uphold a certain quality of life for its citizens (in terms of medical care, 
education, or housing for example).		
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United Nations, as it reflects a nationalistic narrative similar to what a sovereign 
state might have (similar to the way in which the Revolutionary War is 
represented in the US mainstream as an symbol for patriotic values of freedom 
and democracy). This myth is an impassioned claim that generates power 
through the cultural weight of the Holocaust, but it obscures actual intentions 
and history of this document.    
Moyn argues that the intent of these documents was not to prevent 
another Holocaust. Instead, he believes: 
What is fascinating about these documents […] is that while fulsomely 
invoking human rights, they exacerbate the sovereignist premises of 
national welfarism in view of memories of colonialism – including 
colonialist entanglements of human rights in the 1940s. One can recall, 
after all, Western policy as late as 1950 was not to arrest the minimal 
advance of international enforcement of human rights that a few 
advocates demanded, not to insert a colonial clause to ensure that human 
rights did not apply to international spaces. […] They [governmental 
representatives at the UN] invoked human rights to set up a shield against 
intervention, not as a rationale for it, except when ending colonialism was 
at stake. 25 
 
Essentially, the UN produced documents that protected states’ colonialist 
interests and their sovereign power. This argument is evident in the rhetorical 
choices covered below that made this document subservient to sovereign states. 
Because this was a disputed and deliberated text that went through several 
drafts, one must assume that these choices were intentional.  
																																																								
25 Moyn, Human Rights and the Uses of History, 93 
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All conventions and treaties exist within the paradigm that this document 
created. This is similar to the United States Constitution, where amendments or 
clarifications can be added later on but still must adhere to the original context. 
In the human rights system, just like in the United States, this document has 
gained symbolic status; although new rights may be added, these rights still 
must adhere to the discourse the UDHR originally created. There are even calls 
to regress to the original intent and meaning of its rights by UN representatives 
at times. Although the words of UDHR are quite obviously products of their 
time and thus cannot easily be applied to modern society, the UDHR is endowed 
with transcendent qualities: This document purports to contain universal, 
inalienable, and self determined human rights but the rights it presents are 
limited in scope especially to oppressed groups, and the document remains 
restricted to what the “norm” of human experience was in the 1940s26. Because 
every document must reference back to this constrictive article, the entire system 
has been locked into 1940s understandings of the human condition.   
These limitations become very apparent when delving into the specifics of 
how the declaration is organized. Within the document, these rights are 
described as universal, and inalienable: universal meaning all human beings 
																																																								
26 There is no article, for example, about humans being allowed by nation states to have 
consensual sex and/or relationships with same-gender partners; thus there is no protection for the 
queer community in the UDHR. 
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should have them, and inalienable meaning you can not willingly give up these 
rights. In the document, the UN cemented a system for these universal rights 
where nations acquired the role of providing and protecting the rights of their 
citizens, while the UN’s job was to monitor those nations and suggest structures 
to better implement those rights. Although the United Nations by no means 
invented nation states, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights reified the 
state-based structures already in place by building on that foundation.   
 For Zubeda’s case and the conventions connected to it, articles 2, 5, 6, and 
7 are the most essential. Beginning with article 2, the UDHR27 further clarifies 
who the rights apply to while condemning specific forms of discrimination: 
Article 2: Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in 
this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status28. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made 
on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the 
country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, 
trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.29  
Most would probably balk if asked to meticulously write an article that attempts 
to protect all humans from every form of discrimination for the present and 
unforeseeable future. Yet, in five points, this article attempts just that. Even for 
																																																								
 
28 It is noteworthy that the list of possible attributes which people might use to discriminate is 
whittled down in later documents, not expounded upon as new or evolved forms of 
discrimination arose.	29	United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 	
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the 1940s, these articles are reductive. The essentialism of these five categories 
limits their applications, especially because it denies the existence of persecution 
that occurred or was worsened due to multiple by the presence of several 
oppressed identity categories. This invalidates an individual’s experience of 
discrimination, which always operates in ways specific to the individual and the 
multiple facets of their identity. This essentialism is further problematized due to 
the way historical context of these categories: each has changed drastically since 
this convention was written. Take the inclusion of “sex” as a category of 
discrimination: in contemporary usage, there is a distinction between sex, 
gender, and sexuality. However, this definition lumps all together under the 
umbrella of “sex”. The other categories have aged just as well as “sex” did. This 
not only inhibits these categories from being applicable to the modern day, but 
can actually prevent assistance being provided to of people outside of these 
categories who have faced extreme persecution (such as transgender people).  
Article 2, outside of identity categories, also produces interesting 
nationalistic effects: first, it reifies (acknowledging yet still perpetuating the 
categorization of people based on identity) the way in which the government 
classifies its citizens and their social standing, while reproducing the necessity 
and hegemonic normalcy of the nation-citizen relationship. Because in this 
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paradigm, your human rights are protected or violated by your nation30, your 
rights are then limited to your nation’s power. If a person belongs to a self-
governing territory and a separate nation decides to absorb them, without an 
army or other power mechanisms to protect that person’s rights, those rights 
would be violated.  
 Article 5 provides a fleeting discussion on torture, which eventually 
became the basis of an entire convention in 1987. The convention which covers 
torture expanded the definition of torture, however, it still had to use this article 
as the basis of simple and ill-defined article: “Article 5: No one shall be subjected 
to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”31 
Although short and concise, this article provides important information in its 
lack of specificity and demonstrates a very vital part of the UDHR32: leaving huge 
portions of the text open to interpretation. States could simply redefine torture 
based on social mores and what was considered torture at the time based on 
however they defined the intentions of the torturer.33 
 Articles 6 and 7 present an example of how leaving out certain details can 
allow states to follow these articles while still violating human rights. These 																																																								
30 Hannah Arendt. The Origins of Totalitarianism, (New York: Schocken Books, 2004), 291. 
31 United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
32 Ibid.  
33 For example, consider the ongoing debate of whether rape should be legally defined as 
torturous which occurs in Zubeda’s case	
		
32	
articles describe how the equal application of law is a fundamental human right. 
Later, these articles became particularly relevant to non-citizens and the way 
states were supposed to treat them in the legal system:  
Article 6: Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a 
person before the law.  
Article 7: All are equal before the law and are entitled without any 
discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to 
equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this 
Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.34 
Although the declaration does provide a universal legal model for states to use, it 
doesn’t do anything to deter the class bias which occurs in court based systems: 
every human might have equal right to a lawyer, but for immigrants in the 
United States, for example, they must pay for the lawyer themselves or risk the 
extreme likelihood of being deported: 
35 
 
																																																								34	United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 




As the chart above demonstrates, it is almost impossible to get asylum without 
the assistance of an expensive attorney (unless the asylum seeker can find one 
who would work pro bono). Even when the articles do not explicitly favor the 
nation state, by leaving out recommendations for the application of the article it 
allows states to apply it how they see fit. 
The document continued with various other articles, outlining various 
differing rights, but all of them were limited not only by their temporality, but by 
ethnocentrism. Western cultural values are touted as the ideal human experience 
in this document, which is very obvious in Article 16: 
1. Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, 
nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. 
They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its 
dissolution. 2. Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full 
consent of the intending spouses. 3. The family is the natural and 
fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society 
and the State.36  
The heterosexual family as a kinship unit was central to the United States’ 
nationalistic identity, to the point of it becoming an essential human right, as if 
not having the chance to be married (outside of religious reasons, because those 
rights are already protected by a separate article) is close to being equal to the 
right to life or sustenance. It also holds the western ideal of a family unit above 
all others by not even mentioning other forms of families (such as polygamous 																																																								36	United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights.	
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marriages, arranged marriages, matrilocal societies, etc.)  For the UN, this 
limiting document became its core structure, with room to branch out as long as 
the primary ideology remained intact. Thus, the interstices of the UDHR became 
conventions. 
Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 
 Even when conventions claim to be filling some of the gaps that the 
UDHR created, they actually serve to narrow the definitions of human rights and 
which humans should enjoy them. In the “Convention and Protocol Relating to 
the Status of Refugees”, this rings particularly true by inventing a new system 
that purports to protect those who are “rightless” because they lack citizenship. 
With this concept, the necessity of states is cemented, while giving states more 
power to decide who can be a refugee. This status is protected by this document; 
states are not allowed to deport refugees for example. However, it is states who 
get to decide who is a refugee, and that decision is subjective.  
The gap that this convention attempts to fill is one created by the 
“stateless”; groups of people without a nationality that were considered the most 
vulnerable human beings with effectively no rights. The original crisis that 
brought about this discussion was that of Jewish people fleeing Germany during 
World War II. Hannah Arendt wrote at length about the plight of the stateless, 
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and advocated for policy change to prevent the inevitability of stateless and thus 
right-less people that was created in the present system:  
No paradox of contemporary politics is filled with a more poignant irony 
than the discrepancy between the efforts of well-meaning idealists who 
stubbornly insist on regarding as “inalienable” those human rights, which 
are enjoyed only by citizens of the most prosperous and civilized 
countries, and the situation between the rightless themselves. Their 
situation has deteriorated just as stubbornly, until the internment camp- 
prior to the Second World War the exception rather than the rule for the 
stateless- has become the routine solution for the problem of domicile of 
the “displaced persons.” Even the terminology applied to the stateless has 
deteriorated. The term “stateless” at least acknowledged the fact that these 
persons had lost the protection of their government and required 
international agreements for safeguarding their legal status. 37 
Hannah Arendt believed that the loss of citizenship meant the loss of a person’s 
rights, supporting her claim with the mass denaturalization of the Jews during 
World War II. Arendt claimed that rights were tied to citizenship in that states 
were the enforcers of their peoples’ rights, thus without a political community 
the stateless had no one to enforce their rights. Arendt found several issues 
associated with statelessness, which have since been addressed, yet the 
complexity of the problem makes simple solutions almost impossible. 
Connected to this is a way in which many countries have dealt with 
refugees and the stateless: by keeping them out of the borders. Many countries 
enforce their borders fiercely, sometimes resulting in the deaths of those 																																																								37 Arendt. The Origins of Totalitarianism, 279 	
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attempting to gain refuge. According to Suzanne Daley38, Spain (who ratified 
both the convention and the protocol on refugees) has attempted to enforce their 
borders by spending thirty million Euros in physical defenses. Spanish officers 
have gone so far as to shoot immigrants with rubber bullets who were 
attempting to swim into Spain. Fifteen bodies were found in the water 
afterwards. Refugees have the right to asylum, but to do so they need access to 
the countries first. However, Spain (as well as other countries in this position) 
lacks the economic resources to properly handle the bulk of the refugees from 
Africa, many of whom live in makeshift camps with varying degrees of injury.  
 Eventually, the UN responded to these critiques with the Convention for 
Refugees, along with a new grouping of terms and definitions, “refugee” being 
one of them. There are three basic parts to the definition: what makes a refugee, 
when a person stops being a refugee, and who cannot be a refugee. As we’ll see 
later, these definitions become crucial when deciding whether or not to deport 
someone whose life is on the line, so this convention essentially “keeps migration 
exclusion morally defensible while protecting the global gatekeeping operation 
as a whole”39. Regardless of the life or death scenario, a person can be 
																																																								
38 Suzanne Daley, “As Africans Surge to Europe’s Door, Spain Locks Down” (New York Times) 
February 27, 20014. 
39 Jacqueline Bhabha, "Seeking Asylum Alone: Treatment of Separated and Trafficked Children in 




characterized as a non-refugee and thus deported, so delving into the specifics of 
these definitions will demonstrate the complexities which provide an excuse to 
end lives.  
 This gate keeping starts with the basic definition of “refugee”, which 
creates a false dichotomy of legitimate refugee versus regular immigrant through 
the intentions of those who violated their human rights. In this definition, a 
person’s rights must be violated by someone particularly persecuting them based 
on only five different types of identities deemed to be “inalienable” or things that 
a person could not change about themselves: 
As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well- 
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is out- side 
the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not 
having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual 
residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to return to it. 40 
As with other human rights documents, this convention continues the same 
composition patterns as its predesessor, the UDHR, though disproptionate 
definitions. This explanation of the term “refugee” has three parts, and in each 
part there is the essential ambiguity to allow exclusionary politics.  																																																								
40 UN General Assembly, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, United 
Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 189, p. 137, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3be01b964.html [accessed 1 April 2017] 	
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 Firstly, to be a refugee there must be particular persecution. Someone 
must seek out the asylum seeker for a factor of their identity that they cannot 
change about themselves. However, this document only provides five identity 
categories that a human could be persecuted for: race, religion, nationality, 
political opinion, and being a member of a particular social group. Gender, 
sexuality, and disability were not included in this definition41. This puts certain 
oppressed groups immediately at a distinct disadvantage. In their cases they 
must then not only argue that they have been specifically persecuted, but they 
must shoehorn their persecution into one of the five categories42.  
 The Matter of Kasinga case of 1996 was the first example of an asylum 
seeker successfully arguing that the persecution she faced as a cisgender woman 
in Togo fit into the “member of a particular social group” (PSG) category. 
Although she gained asylum for gender-based persecution, this decision still fit 
into the system, and altered it minimally. This case became a precedent: people 
persecuted for their gender could now attempt to argue that they were being 
persecuted for being in a particular social group. This new path raises its own 
new set of issues: to make this argument successfully, the asylum seekers must 
prove three things: that they are in a particular social group, that that group is 																																																								
41 Sara L. McKinnon, Gendered Asylum: Race and Violence in U.S. Law and Politics. (University of 
Illinois, 2016).  
42 Jacqueline Bhabha ,and Sue Shutter. Women's Movement: Women Under Immigration, Nationality 
and Refugee Law, (Staffordshire, Eng: Trentham Books, 1994).	
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recognizable in their country of origin, and that they were persecuted based on 
their membership in that group. The group cannot be too broad, else it becomes 
too “common” to count as persecution, or too narrow, or else it is too obscure to 
be socially recognizable. In the Kasinga case, her attorney’s used her tribal 
identity to argue for PSG, claiming her group was  “young women of the 
Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe who have not had FGM [female genital mutilation], as 
practiced by that tribe, and who oppose the practice.”43 Because the tribe was a 
recognized social group and the women were singled out, she gained asylum. If 
not for her indigenous identity, she would have most likely had a PSG that was 
too broad. In her case, this was often discussed: if the judge allowed one African 
woman asylum to flee from circumcision, wouldn’t all African women then come 
to the United States? This was the legal rhetoric of the Kasinga case, which is 
inherently racist and essentialist, but it demonstrates how a broad PSG definition 
can potentially harm a case. In the inverse scenario, take for example the Matter 
of A-R-C-G et al., which was decided in 2014. This case featured a social group, 
“married woman in Guatemala who was unable to leave the relationship”, that 
was too specific for the judge and thus the persecution could be discounted as 
random: 
The Immigration Judge found that the respondent did not demonstrate 																																																								
43 In re Fauziya Kasinga, 3278, United States Board of Immigration Appeals, 13 June 1996, 
available at: http://www.refworld.org/cases,USA_BIA,47bb00782.html [accessed 3 April 2017]	
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that she had suffered past persecution or has a well-founded fear of future 
persecution on account of a particular social group comprised of “married 
women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship.” The 
Immigration Judge determined that there was inadequate evidence that 
the respondent’s spouse abused her “in order to overcome” the fact that 
she was a “married woman in Guatemala who was unable to leave the 
relationship.” He found that the respondent’s abuse was the result of 
“criminal acts, not persecution,” which were perpetrated “arbitrarily” and 
“without reason.” He accordingly found that the respondent did not meet 
her burden of demonstrating eligibility for asylum or withholding of 
removal under the Act.44 
The details of the legal arguments required to get there make it almost 
impossible for women who do not have the benefit of a lawyer, or those whose 
cases are a little more complicated. Thus a rather straight forward case of a 
woman being persecuted for her own gender must go through an intensive legal 
ordeal to be successful in this system due to the narrow definitions provided of 
what it means to be a refugee.  
Even if someone were to possess all the traits that would allow them to be 
characterized as a refugee, there are several factors that would prohibit them 
from that protection. These include their nationality, changing country 
conditions, or crimes they may have committed. Some countries have laws about 
countries they do and do not accept refugees from; for example, Canada refuses 
																																																								
44 Matter of A-R-C-G- et al., 26 I&N Dec. 388 (BIA 2014), United States Board of Immigration 
Appeals, 26 August 2014, available at: http://www.refworld.org/cases,USA_BIA,5400846f4.html 
[accessed 2 April 2017] 
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to take asylum seekers from the United States.45 These asylum seekers can also 
lose asylum if their country’s human rights conditions change: a war ending, a 
coup, or an in flux of government forces removing a threat (such as a gang) 
would all be reasons that the United States could reconsider a country to be 
“safe” for their refugees and thus return them to their country of origin. Lastly, if 
the asylum seeker had committed a crime or even participated in a group that is 
considered to commit terrorist activities, that person cannot gain asylum.   
The case of Ibrahim Parlak demonstrates this last exclusion. He fled Turkey in 
1991 and he was granted asylum in 1992 to protect him from the ethnic 
persecution he faced as a Kurd. In 1997, the United States officially labeled the 
Kurdish Worker’s Party to be a terrorist group, and suddenly Parlak had a 
terrorist background and was in danger of being deported. Turkey requested his 
return so he could be tried and convicted for the crimes he committed as a 
Kurdish activist; he had previously been tortured in high school for his political 
activities. The case is on going; he could be deported any day for his activities as 
a young man46. Parlak’s case demonstrates the effects these rhetorical spaces 
																																																								45 There is a fascinating history about asylum seekers from the U.S., even if some countries do 
not recognize these individuals as refugees. The most pertinent and recent example would be 
black panthers fleeing persecution; Assata Shakur fled to Cuba because it was one of the few 
countries that would offer protection from the United States (as detailed in her autobiography, 




have for governments to utilize; the United States decided not to take terrorists 
as refugees, labeled an activist group as a terrorist organization, and thus were 
allowed to revoke protection for Parlak. This case demonstrates the arbitrary 
nature of refugee status; the same person can go from “deserving” to 
“undeserving” easily if the government flexes its power to redefine the 
perimeters of their protection or if the political situation in either country 
changes.  
Outside of labeling certain groups as “terrorist”, governments can label 
entire countries as refugee producing, or non-refugee producing. These decisions 
have symbolic weight to geopolitical relationships, and thus demonstrate the 
alternative advantages to redefining the definition of refugee. In the United 
States, the 1994 “wet feet, dry feet” policy from the Clinton administration was 
an excellent example of how relationships between nations could produce 
immigration policies. Essentially, the policy allowed any Cuban who set foot in 
the United States automatically gain asylum.47 Coastguards could return any 
asylum seekers if they were caught in the ocean, but those arriving by plane did 
not face that issue. This policy drained Cuba of its wealthier citizens who could 
afford a plane ticket while making the bold statement that Cuba violated the 																																																																																																																																																																						
47 Ann Bardach, "Why Are Cubans So Special?" The New York Times. January 29, 2015. Accessed 




rights of its citizens. On the flipside, there is the concept of a “safe country” 
which signifies a country that has been deemed to not produce refugees 48, so 
other countries could refuse to take asylum seekers from there. Although “safe 
countries” are somewhat theoretical, countries like Canada, or Sweden are 
examples of countries that are considered to not produce refugees by other 
nations. Clearly, these decisions symbolize relationships between countries; 
accepting refugees can be an insult between governments and can send a 
political message. Not accepting refugees’ signals a sense of trust. By deciding 
refugee cases by entire countries, governments communicate their perceived 
relationships and opinions about one another. This facet of the system reveals the 
way in which the term “refugee” is used for political reasons, which works 
directly against the prevention of human rights violations.  
 “Refugee”, when examined, quickly loses a lot of its meaning due to the 
arbitraury way it is used, especially in the “Convention and Protocol Relating to 
the Status of Refugees”. This document was a response to the issue of refugees, 
or the statelessness. Instead of a remedy to the extreme vulnerability experienced 
by those without a state to protect them, this document produced a system which 
																																																								48	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. "Background Note on the Safe Country 





prioritized the assistance of a privileged few while providing justification for 
ignoring the rest. Due to an overly specific description of “refugee” paired with 
ambiguous articles, the application of this convention created the United States 
asylum system and the fundamental binary at the heart of it: the deserving and 
undeserving immigrant. The deserving immigrant, like many other privileged 
groups, functions mostly as a foil to the undeserving. The traits associated with 
the undeserving can change or be modified to fit contemporary needs, but 
essentially it is a scheming, selfish migrant. Someone who lies to trick their way 
into a space meant for someone who “actually” needs it. This binary implies 
another important myth: a false sense of scarcity paired with the belief that 
immigrants are a detriment to the communities they inhabit.  
  
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane, or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment 
 
In 1984, the United Nations produced a document, The “Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment” that was hotly debated: Every article was deliberated, and each 
word considered. This deliberation occurred because banning torture was a 
somewhat contentious subject, although certainly not new. A proposed 
prohibition of prolonged human suffering has occurred sporadically throughout 
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history; the Calas Affair49 is one example. The effects of this debate were limited 
by 20th century understandings of torture: prolonged physical and mental pain, 
generally used in war, by men. It was separate from punishment and random 
violence due to the importance of intent. These specifications were the product of 
debate at the UN, and occurred over 38 different sessions: the end result 
continued the trend of the other human rights documents, and served state 
interest over human rights.  
 The backdrop of this historical document and new understanding of 
torture coincides with the history of Amnesty International, a pioneering NGO 
which refined the role not-for-profits had with sovereign states. Amnesty 
International was founded in 1961 by Peter Benenson, a Jewish lawyer from 
London who was enraged by an article he read about Portuguese students who 
were sentenced to seven years in prison for raising their glasses to freedom50. He 
was inspired to pen his famous essay, which publicized Appeal for Amnesty, a 
campaign that became Amnesty International. The article, “Four Forgotten 
																																																								
49 Jean Calas was a French Protestant Christian who was convicted of murdering his son to 
prevent him from converting to Catholicism. He was sentenced to death by the wheel, a torture 
device that slowly rips the victim apart. Voltaire used this case to argue against torture, and the 
religious corruption he felt was present in its ruling. See Lynn Hunt’s Inventing Human Rights for 




Prisoners”, seeks to defend the 18th51 and 19th52 articles in the “Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights”, mainly the right to have and express opinions 
(political and religious) freely. In this document, which renewed the 
conversation on torture (even citing Voltaire), we see the first seeds of how 
torture would be framed in the upcoming campaigns by Amnesty International. 
 Benenson began his essay with an example of prisoners of conscience53. 
These examples not only place torture exclusively in male centric spheres, but 
limits torture to male experiences: 
In Spain, students who circulate leaflets calling for the right to hold 
discussions on current affairs are charged with "military rebellion." In 
Hungary, Catholic priests who have tried to keep their choir schools open 
have been charged with "homosexuality."54  
 
Using the Catholic church and Universities as his examples completely blocked 
women from this discussion, because women could not participate as leaders in 
the Catholic church regardless of the country, and in Spain during the 1960s 
gender equality was just being introduced so most women were still confined to 
																																																								
51 Article 18: Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion: this right 
includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom either alone or in company with 
others in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and 
observance. 
52 Article 19: Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression: this right includes 
freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and 
ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers. 
53 “‘Prisoners of Conscience;’ […]: "Any person who is physically restrained (by imprisonment or 
otherwise) from expressing (in any form of words or symbols) any opinion which he honestly 
holds and which does not advocate or condone personal violence." We also exclude those people 
who have conspired with a foreign government to overthrow their own.” 
54 Peter Beneson, “Four Forgotten Prisoners,” Amnesty International, accessed May 2, 2017	
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the domestic sphere55. These examples, and others like them, became the 
standard in explaining prisoners of conscience. The issue of prisoners of 
conscience then opened the floor to the debate on torture, but prisoners of 
conscience were at the forefront of that debate because they represented the 
perfect victim.  
 Benenson’s brainchild snowballed into Amnesty International, whose 
main focus was prisoners of conscience. A decade after its inception, in their 
annual report on the international rights situation, they detailed their campaign 
for the abolition of torture. Describing a meeting in Paris, the report summarizes 
the work of four committees, but the most notable one was Committee B:  
Commission B, dealing with the socioeconomic and political factors 
affecting torture, formulated special recommendations for action against 
torture to be taken by police and military personnel, religious 
organizations, educators, artists, trade unions and business enterprises 
and employers.56 
 
Because Amnesty International had situated torture as a male issue, the 
professionals who they believed would assist in this movement were all in male 
dominated spheres. It is particularly notable that they wanted police and military 
to take action, when it was those actors who were specifically committing torture 
																																																								
55 "Spain - The Changing Attitudes In Spain." Gender, Cohabitation, Family, Definition, 
Development, and Family - JRank Articles. Accessed May 09, 2017. 
http://family.jrank.org/pages/1622/Spain-Changing-Attitudes-in-Spain.html. 
56 Amnesty International. Annual Report 1973-1974. 
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with impunity. This is the campaign that inspired the United Nations to write the 
“Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment”, and it began with a completely biased and 
ineffectual perspective of what torture was and who suffered it.  
 The question of torture was submitted to the agenda for the 29th session of 
the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1974, and it was decided that the 
Third Committee (dealing with social, humanitarian and cultural issues) would 
examine the issue and make a document of their findings. They created updates 
and drafts until the 58th session; tracking the drafts and changes made to the 
document, as well as the recommended changes, reveals the discourse of the 
document which contains the shifting and accepted definitions and boundaries 
of human suffering.  
 While drafting the document, a paper trail was left behind which 
demonstrates the bureaucratic process of the United Nations; dozens of reports 
exist in which proposals to suspend, reexamine, or to add in new considerations 
litter the online archives of the United Nations. Hundreds of documents mention 
torture, yet only contain phrases such as,  
The Economic and Social Council approves the recommendation made by 
the Commission on Human Rights in paragraph 2 of its resolution 18 
(XXXIV) and authorizes the holding of a meeting of a working group open 
to all members of the Commission for one week immediately before the 
thirty-fifth session of the Commission with the task of preparing for the 
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Commission concrete drafting proposals for a draft convention on torture 
and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.57 
 
These types of documents show the arbitrary yet time-consuming processes that 
are a product of the United Nations system; it took over a decade to produce this 
document.  
 During the thirty-fourth session, on January 23rd, 1978, Sweden presented 
a draft that became the foundation of the polished document. Throughout the 
text, “cruel, degrading, or inhumane treatment or punishment” is given equal 
standing with torture, but in doing so the authors created a division between 
“punishment” and “torture”. Later on, this distinction made it far easier for 
torture to be banned, as it was differentiated from inhumane punishment and 
thus sovereign governments could hypothetically ban interrogation while 
keeping solitary confinement. Something that remains prevalent in the US, even 
though solitary confinement is now defined in international conventions as an 
aspect of torture. This fact is especially important, because even the inclusion of 
punishment was a site of debate. The US was one of the main and successful 
actors against its inclusion58, because banning cruel punishment would have 
infringed on the United States norms.  
																																																								
57 J.H. Burgers, “Report of the Working Group on a Draft Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.”  (United Nations, 1984). 
58 Iveta Cherneva, “The Drafting History of Article 2 of the Convention Against Torture” (Essex 
Human Rights Review 9.1, 2012), 8 
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The debates surrounding this particular document illuminate the changes 
which were then represented in the final product. In a response to the Swedish 
draft, one Egyptian representative, Ms. Emara, inquired on the specific wording 
regarding where the state has an obligation to prevent torture and how the 
Swedish draft failed to cover occupied territories. French representatives also 
argued against the wording, however, their issue was quite different: 
France voiced the argument that the phrase ‘within its jurisdiction’ should 
be replaced with ‘in its territory’ because the phrase ‘within its 
jurisdiction’ could be interpreted too widely to cover citizens of one state 
who are resident in another state. That argument was countered with the 
observation that the wording ‘within its jurisdiction’ would cover torture 
inflicted aboard a ship or an aircraft registered in that state, as well as its 
occupied territories.59 
Yet again, the document was pushed to better reflect the norms as opposed to the 
possibilities and essentially allowed governments to torture colonial subjects. 
Large phrases like this contribute to the freedoms benefiting governments in this 
document, but even the small definitions of certain words favor governments 
over human beings.  
The most important piece of this document lies in its definitions. These 
definitions build off of Amnesty International’s framework, while furthering the 
masculinization and even narrowing the concept of torture further. The 
definition of “Torture” in this draft, means, 																																																								59	Burgers, “Report of the Working Group”, 39 
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any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or 
mental, is intentionally inflicted by or at the instigation of a public 
official on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a 
third person information or confession, punishing him for an act he 
has committed or is suspected of having committed, or 
intimidating him or other persons. It does not include pain or 
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful 
sanctions to the extent consistent with the Standard Minimum 
Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.60 
 
Notably, masculine pronouns are used through out, already providing an 
overtone indicating who can be tortured. The authors have also limited torture to 
three possible scenarios: at the request of a public official61, as punishment, or for 
intimidation. This leaves out all other situations of torture that are experienced 
more by women, like rape. This effectively creates fewer cases of torture while 
erasing the torture felt by oppressed minorities.  
 
 The final document is the culmination of months of debate by dozens of 
different UN actors, and yet it has by far the narrowest conceptualization of what 
one should consider torture. This indicates that the authors were swayed over 
time to specify the experience of torture and thus implicitly acquiesce to the 
																																																								60	Lars Grundberg, “Draft of the International Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhumane, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.” (United Nations, 1978).	
61 This particular part of the article perfectly demonstrates how vague and thus inefficient these 
documents are. I know they are attempting to prevent blame deferral, but they don’t go into any 
of the reasons why an official might request that someone be tortured, nor do they ban officials 
from asking their underlings to torture others.  
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majority of torture occurring. To completely unravel this definition, it must be 
quoted in its entirety: 
For the purposes of this Convention, the term "torture" means any act by 
which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is 
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from 
him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an 
act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having 
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any 
reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering 
is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence 
of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not 
include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to 
lawful sanctions.62 
   
This paragraph protects state interests through three compositional devices: 
through ambiguous adjectives, the use of overly specific scenarios, and the 
structure it recommends for determining torture. First, the vague use of words 
like “severe”, or “suspected” essentially provide a political “fill in the blanks” for 
government actors to use at their own convenience. Secondly, the four different 
scenarios of torture are arbitrarily restrictive, and seem to only imagine torture in 
spaces of war or conflict. Finally, advocating that torture be defined by the 
intentions of the torturer instead of the experience of the tortured invalidates the 
experiences of victims of torture while putting the onus on them to prove the 
intent behind their torturers’ actions. Each compositional subtlety like these three 
																																																								
62 UN General Assembly, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, 10 December 1984, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1465, p. 85, 
available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3a94.html [accessed 2 May 2017] 
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examples puts more and more interpretive power into the hands of sovereign 
states, and these were intentional choices.  
 The history of the convention and the document itself does not reveal the 
authors’ definition of torture; more so it reveals a discourse that determined who 
should be protected from suffering, and what obligation states had in the 
protection of that person. Although this system purports to be an upholder of 
human rights, due to its nature it instead protects state sovereignty and 
government interests. If that is true, then this document is not ineffectual at all, 
but in fact quite successful.  
 United States domestic law operates using same the definitions of the 
three previously covered UN texts, and demonstrates in practice what the over 
and under specificity of the wording allows governments to do. Even if it had a 
religious adherence to the UDHR’s human rights standards (which it does not), 
the US’s immigration system would still violate the rights of thousands each year 
simply based on its’ heavy reliance on subjectivity. This system puts immigrants 
through a criminal trial, where they are required to provide evidence, give 
testimony, and painstakingly wrangle with the legal norms to try and make their 




The way in which the United States adopted these conventions 
demonstrates exactly how a government can protect its sovereignty instead of 
human rights through exploitation of the “wiggle room” provided by these 
disproportionate descriptions. The entire process of being an asylum seeker 
(someone attempting to gain asylum) is an example in and of itself. It follows 
most of the protocols provided by the United Nations, but it takes years to go 
through, is incredibly expensive, and in the process causes human rights 
violations of its own. This bureaucratic process has several stages: if not in 
deportation proceedings, it begins with an asylum officer, then the immigration 
court, the board of immigration appeals, the circuit courts, and finally, the 
supreme court. At any stage the decision can be “remanded” or returned to a 
lower court. This minimizes the affects of a decision; the higher courts can use 
this by essentially agreeing with the lower court and then they do not have to 
make a decision themselves that could be precedential. Below is a chart to depict 





The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, meaning the same branch 
of the government whose purpose is to filter and exclude people, controls this 
system. Unsurprisingly, the asylum system in the United States is far more 
concerned with removing the “undeserving” than sheltering the “deserving”. 
This is especially true after the 1990 Immigration Act that reflected the new 
bipartisan trend of anti-immigration policies.63 The first level of the asylum 
system is to submit an application for asylum within a year of arrival64. Then, the 
asylum seeker would have a private interview with an asylum officer who has 
																																																								
63 Joseph Nevins. Operation Gatekeeper: The Rise of the "Illegal Alien" and the Making of the U.S.-
Mexico Boundary, (New York: Routledge, 2002), 107.  
64 This time limit is completely arbitrary, because there is no argument for why it exists. It 
certainly isn’t fantastical to imagine an asylum seeker whose country had changed over the 
course of several years in a way that would make their return dangerous or life threatening.			
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the power to decide whether or not they receive asylum or are deported. This 
interview is a privilege, however, because it is exclusively for those who can 
legally travel into the United States and ask for asylum from within, or who have 
traveled across the border without being apprehended. Those who are caught at 
the border, or those who were denied by the asylum officer and seek to appeal 
the decision, go to immigration court. At this level, the ambiguity and arbitrary 
specificities of the prior documents becomes clear. Judges have the power to 
decide on a case-by-case basis whether or not the immigrant is a refugee or not; 
there is no in between and thus a binary of “deserving” and “undeserving” 
immigrants is produced.  
The process of immigration systems, and the act of attempting to find and 
regulate true refugees produces the characters of “deserving” and “undeserving” 
immigrant while attributing specific traits to both. What these processes do is to 
create a binary of “deserving” and “undeserving” immigrants, allowing states to 
define the process of applying these stereotypes to real human beings: 
[O]ne important effect of the bureaucratized humanitarian 
interventions that are set in motion by large populations 
displacements is to leach out the histories and the politics of 
specific refugees’ circumstances. Refugees stop being specific 
persons and become pure victims in general; universal man, 
universal woman, universal child, and, taken together, universal 
family. (Linke, 101)65 																																																								





In the production of the universal victim, a universal impostor is also constructed 
who attempts to cheat the system. The justified immigrant must be completely 
without fault, and fit every needless specificity that these UN documents 
provide. All others fall into the category of deceptive immigrant, a greedy and 
malevolent character attempting to suck resources from unfortunate countries 
that happen to have the resources to support them.  
 
The inherent criminality of immigrants is central to many human rights 
debates; viewing refugees as guilty until proven innocent serves as a gate-
keeping paradigm that ultimately defies basic definitions of human rights: 
[…] States have resisted adoption of any standards on treatment of non-
nationals. A counter-offensive against human rights as universal, 
indivisible and inalienable underlies resistance to extension of human 
rights protection to migrants. A parallel trend is deliberate association of 
migration and migrants with criminality. […] Intergovernmental 
cooperation on migration “management” is expanding rapidly, with 
functioning regional intergovernmental consultative processes in all 
regions, generally focused on strengthening inter-state cooperation in 
controlling and preventing irregular migration through improved border 
controls, information sharing, return agreements and other measures.66 
 
Patrick A. Taran demonstrates here the state exigency in preventing non-citizens 
from entering the country. During this time period (and explanations do change 
																																																								66	Patrick A. Taran "Human rights of migrants: challenges of the New Decade", (International 
Migration. 38, no. 6.), 8	
		
58	
over time), the United States was preventing immigration as a way of reasserting 
its power after a terrorist attack on its own soil on 9/11.  
 The power of sorting human beings into this crude binary and enforcing 
the criminalization of immigrants rests in the hands of a judge. Complete 
subjectivity is not just allowed in these cases, but encouraged. In the Judge’s 
Benchbook, a guide for immigration judges written by the Executive Office for 
Immigration Review, the recommendation for how judges should consider 
evidence like witness testimony is: 
Credibility determination - Considering the totality of the circumstances, 
and all relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility determination 
on the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the applicant or witness, 
the inherent plausibility of the applicant's or witness's account, the 
consistency between the applicant's or witness's written and oral 
statements (whenever made and whether or not under oath, and 
considering the circumstances under which the statements were made), 
the internal consistency of each such statement, the consistency of such 
statements with other evidence of record (including the reports of the 
Department of State on country conditions), and any inaccuracies or 
falsehoods in such statements, without regard to whether an 
inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant's 
claim, or any other relevant factor. There is no presumption of credibility, 
however, if no adverse credibility determination is explicitly made, the 
applicant or witness shall have a rebuttable presumption of credibility on 
appeal.67 
 
This set of standards, “demeanor, candor, or responsiveness,” fundamentally 
requires subjective judgment. By looking at case rejection statistics, the subjective 




and thus unequal application of the law is evident: Judge Larry R. Dean of New 
York, from 2000-2005, denied 84.5 of his asylum cases. Also in New York, Judge 
Margaret McManus over the same period denied 9.8 percent of her cases68. 
Perhaps in a strange twist of fate, Judge Dean only saw non-deserving 
immigrants and Judge McManus only saw deserving ones. But the more likely 
scenario is that the law allows for judges to subjectively decide the fate of 
thousands of people each year, which leads to a disproportionate amount of 
rejections depending on the personal biases or temperament of the judge.  
 These subjective decisions have significance in the United States: each one 
can be referenced and thus used to deny thousands of other asylum seekers later 
on. More importantly, these decisions are a site of identity production for the 
United States. Within these judgments are explicit and specific definitions of the 
human body and experience. In The Matter of Kasinga for example, the 9th Circuit 
deliberated on a cultural practice they had never been party to: female 
circumcision. During this case, they define a woman’s basic human experience as 
one that requires sexual pleasure: implicit in that decision are dozens of explicit 
categorizations. “Woman” comes to be equated with a vagina deemed to be 
“functional”, through heterosexual intercourse and the ability to give birth. The 
system produces the meanings of race, gender, sex, religion, ability, and prescript 																																																								




those meanings unto the human body forcibly; deportation (which can be a death 
sentence) is on the line if a person cannot fit within the parameters of those 
categories. Through their own interpretations of these documents, the United 
States immigration system enforces oppressive hierarchal structures and can 
reassert its state power and proliferate nationalism through the production of a 
common enemy. The protection and proliferation of state power through subtle 
but crucial rhetorical choices within these texts produced a paradigm shift, 
justifying the status quo more so than changing it.  In the Zubeda case, the living 
consequences of these documents becomes clear as each level of the court uses 
their definitions to deny her humanity while enforcing state power.  
 
1. Echoes in the Court Chambers: Hidden Biases and Necessary 
Incompetence  
 
The actors in the United States asylum system utilize the loopholes in the 
United Nations documents, to help shape the discourse concerning immigrants 
in the United States: although prior to 9/11 there wasn’t a shortage on 
xenophobia, the events that transpired that day dramatically increased hateful 
rhetoric as immigrants were the strawman for “terror”. Although Zubeda was 
from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and was not a Muslim (the most 
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targeted religious group after 9/11), she still felt the consequences of this 
discourse and suffered greatly. The system was already set up for subjectivity 
and thus the allowance of personal biases; accordingly, this case was built on 
assumptions, omissions, and falsehoods. Even though Zubeda was eventually 
allowed to stay (without any of the benefits of being a refugee, of course), it was 
due to her lawyers agreeing with the judge’s logic and pushing it further. 
This chapter provides an in depth reading of the court documents to 
illuminate the assumptions Judge Durling first made in the Immigration Court, 
that Zubeda was not credible but should not be deported. At the Board of 
Immigration Appeals, that logic was taken a step further as the board agreed if 
she was not credible, she should be deported. This surprising ruling can be 
linked to new immigration policies occurring at the time, which created a 
bottleneck of immigration cases that forced court officials to make hasty or 
erroneous decisions. Finally, at Third Circuit court the decision simply remanded 
the decision back to Judge Durling, completing a full circle that accepted the 
subjectivity of Durling’s statements at every level.  
Zubeda did not receive asylum, and the reasons for this reveal how much 
evidence must be given in support of an asylum seeker while very little was 
needed to deny them. Judge Durling cited two reasons for this denial: lack of 
credibility, and lack of evidence. Durling cited six points of her testimony that he 
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found to be lacking, or as it is labeled in asylum law, incredible. When used in a 
legal context, this means “improbable” or “not to be believed”. Judge Durling 
provided several reasons for his adverse credibility ruling.  This included the 
discrepancy between her stating that she did not know any of the soldiers who 
had raped her, and her writing that she was able to recognize one of the soldiers 
as someone she had seen in her town; that she said her mother and sister had 
burned to death, but in her written testimony she stated that she was unsure if 
they had survived the fire; after being raped, she testified that she was placed in 
a truck, while in her written statement she was placed into a car, and the number 
of women who were abducted with her fluctuated between one and four; lastly, 
in the camp she referred to three women, one woman, and then three women 
again in explaining her time there and eventual escape. Notably, Ms. Zubeda did 
not speak English when these written and verbal testimonies were given. There 
are many instances of translation error leading to a perceived lie, and thus a lack 
of credibility.69 Particularly with the car and truck discrepancy, those two words 
basically provide the same meaning: a vehicle. The sixth and final reason Judge 
Durling gave for not believing Zubeda was the perceived ease with which she 
escaped, and how she neglected to provide details about her flight such as how 
																																																								69	A	documentary,	A	Well	Founded	Fear,	records	translator	error	and	its	effects	on	asylum	seekers’	cases	while	recording	asylum	officers.		
Anne Delaney, and Phil Glendinning, A Well Founded Fear. (Video Education Australasia, 2011). 	
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long the boat ride was, or what body of water they crossed. An important thing 
to remember is that these are the recollections of a trauma victim, who had 
experienced torture and the loss of everyone she knew in a matter of days. Small 
memory errors are expected in such situations. 
Judge Durling purportedly rejected those opinions because of the specific 
nature of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s human rights condition. Judge 
Durling believed that Zubeda did not fit with the definition of refugee as set out 
by the “Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees”. This definition stated 
that to be a refugee, Zubeda would need to prove that she was sought out and 
persecuted based on her race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or her 
membership in a particular group. Noticeably, Zubeda’s story fits into those 
narrow categories. She was persecuted for her gender, which has been 
considered as a particular social group by several judges. She and her family 
were persecuted for not supporting the rebellion, which had taken control of 
South Kivu at the time. Her membership in the Bembe tribe could also have 
made her vulnerable to attack, as well as her religion as a converted Christian. It 
is impossible to ever truly know why she was targeted, but the results remain the 
same. The official claim put forth by her lawyers argued that she was persecuted 
because of her father’s political opinions (whatever opinions led him to consider 
reporting the rape of his wife to human rights organizations near by). Both Judge 
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Durling, and the Immigration and Naturalization Services disagreed that this 
was a legitimate basis for persecution.  
        Judge Durling’s explanation for this rejection relates back to the Matter of 
A-R-C-G et al., where the asylum seeker’s purposed particular social group was 
too narrow; in Zubeda’s case, her group was too wide. In his decision, Judge 
Durling found that she wasn’t singled out enough to prove particular 
persecution, writing: 
[…] I am not unaware of the atrocious human rights violations in 
the Congo, including the raping of women by security forces, and 
the indiscriminate murders of civilians by these forces. All in all, 
the government of the Congo is a miserable excuse of a sovereign 
government, and I cannot grant relief to an alien on the mere fact of 
hailing from such a country. Again, this respondent’s testimony is 
suspect for the reasons I have noted, and she has the burden of 
proof to present detailed and consistent testimony, which she has 
failed to do. Consequently, I have no alternative but to deny her 
application for asylum and withholding of removal[2] [...].70 
Each word and statement require deconstruction to understand exactly what 
Judge Durling communicated by denying her for these specific reasons. Firstly, 
his statement contained a double negative, “I am not unaware”, these carefully 
chosen words neither confirmed nor denied the depth of his knowledge but 
covered him enough to purport a lack of ignorance. Ironically, this statement did 
demonstrate ignorance to Zubeda’s case as he misunderstood the fundamental 																																																								
70 In the Matter of Takky Zubeda, (United States Immigration Court, York PA October 22, 2001). 
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argument of who was persecuting her and for what reason. Firstly, he referred to 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo as simply, the “Congo”, erasing a 
complicated history of that region which led to the separation of two states and 
the consequential differing names. More importantly, this statement 
demonstrated his lack of understanding of the political situation in the DRC, in 
that Judge Durling conflated the rebels that persecuted Zubeda with the 
government. His statement “the government of the Congo is a miserable excuse 
of a sovereign government, [yet] I cannot grant relief to an alien on the mere fact 
of hailing from such a country”71 completely misrepresented the facts of 
Zubeda’s case. The DRC was in the throes of a civil war, in which a large region 
had been taken and controlled by rebel soldiers. Her past persecution was by this 
faction of the DRC, and could not have been helped by the official government. 
His assertion that her experience of torture was not unique to her, and was 
merely a typical experience of a Congolese person was false then, because her 
persecution was a result of the political situation, and her family’s opinions, and 
most importantly her gender. By denying the warfare and making it out to be a 
form of daily civil strife, Judge Durling fundamentally distorted the facts of this 
case. Such an erasure demonstrates the way in which a subjective analysis was 
preferred over fact. Regardless of the country conditions reports that were 																																																								71	In the Matter of Takky Zubeda, 2001 	
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submitting that back up Zubeda’s claims72. Even if there was evidence that 
human rights violations were happening around her, the framework allowed the 
judge to dismiss her claims if he didn’t believe that those specific violations 
happened her. Judge Durling followed the Judge’s Benchbook, considered her 
demeanor and the way she related her experiences, and found her incredible, in 
step with the asylum system.  
Another important assumption Judge Durling made was the conclusion 
that her experiences were “normal” for a citizen of the DRC. This means Zubeda 
would not be able to fit under the “particular persecution” part of the refugee 
definition, but Durling’s judgments had no factual backing. Her home region, 
indigeniety, class status, opinions, and most importantly gender set her apart 
from other citizens. As a woman living in a war-torn area, she was specifically 
targeted. This is extremely pertinent because this method was brought into the 
DRC as Hutus fled to the DRC (Zaire at the time) and continued launching 
assaults against Tutsis (in Rwanda and Zaire) from refugee camps. Zubeda’s 
ethnic identity as a member of the Bembe placed her in direct conflict with both 
Hutus and Tutsis as the Bembes had past and ongoing conflicts with both 
groups. Zubeda was specifically targeted as a result of this conflict, but because 
																																																								
72 IRIN, DRC: Rape cases soar in South Kivu, 3 June 2009, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4a2e1016c.html [accessed 9 May 2017] 
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Judge Durling did not recognize the civil war in his decision, he could come to 
the conclusion that she was not.  
In his decision, Judge Durling came to conclusions based on subjective 
assumptions. However, it must be clear: this decision was analyzed through two 
other court systems and by countless lawyers and was deemed acceptable. This 
decision was not a break from the system, but an accurate representation of how 
the Immigration court operated. Asylum could be easily lost not on the basis of 
an asylum seeker’s merits, but by the social context of the court room; who the 
judge is, what their personal biases may be, and how their perspective is effected 
by current world events (like 9/11 in Judge Durling’s case).  
        Despite the rejection of Zubeda’s asylum claims, she was allowed to stay 
in the United States based on the Convention Against Torture. Judge Durling 
ruled that there was significant probability of her being tortured upon her return; 
this ruling contained notable arguments about the DRC, torture, and 
imprisonment. These conclusions hold particular importance because they were 
then reexamined, debated, and reinforced in the proceeding court cases. The BIA 
agreed with the majority of Judge Durling’s statements, and when they 
disagreed with him it was on the basis that he was being too lenient and took his 
assumptions a step further. In the Third Circuit they remanded this case back to 
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the Immigration judge, because they found his decision to be acceptable. 
Essentially, Judge Durling’s analysis of her suffering was ultimately accepted.  
 The overarching crux of his argument was that being a citizen of the DRC 
meant you would more likely than not be tortured, particularly if you had a 
cause to interact with government officials: 
Notwithstanding my concerns about the respondent’s testimony, there 
has not been raised as an issue in this case the respondent’s Congolese 
nationality and citizenship. Consequently, the United States must seek the 
permission of the government of Congo [sic] in returning this respondent 
to her homeland. And it is this very point which greatly troubles me. As 
noted above, the State Department Country Reports, as well as other 
documentary evidence, shows a government which takes upon itself the 
systematic abuse of large segments of its population. The security forces 
are out of control, if indeed the government has any real interest in 
exerting control over its forces. Not only is there arbitrary and random 
violence against opponents of the regime, but against the hapless 
population as well, including against those persons detained or 
imprisoned, including the systematic use of torture.73 
Again, there was no mention of any of the significant political events in the DRC 
which led to Zubeda’s persecution. This erasure created a false understanding of 
her experience; by ignoring the war, the Judge can more easily characterize 
Zubeda as an undeserving immigrant. Someone who left a “bad” country to go 
to a “good” country, instead of someone fleeing war and torture.  
																																																								73	In the Matter of Takky Zubeda (United States Immigration Court, York PA October 22, 2001). 
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After evaluating the country conditions as generally poor, Judge Durling 
ended his statement with a generalized theory as to what could possibly happen 
to Zubeda should she return: 
Can I state with any degree of confidence that this respondent would be 
permitted to arrive in the Congo and immediately go about her business 
unmolested? No I can’t, and neither can I state with any degree of 
certainty that the respondent would be physically harmed upon her 
return. [...] I have little confidence that this respondent, whatever her 
background, would be treated with more deference than her fellow 
citizens, none of whom apparently is immune to government atrocities. It 
is clear from the evidence in this record that the Congolese government, 
through its security forces, are irresponsible as a whole and have no 
regard for the well being nor the human rights of its citizens.74  
Consider the irony that he found it to be unlikely that she was raped, and yet 
was unable to send her back because it was likely that she will be raped. Again, 
this was partially due to his belief that she wasn’t specifically targeted, as he 
stated that the DRC “didn’t hold a monopoly on abusive treatment of its 
citizens” thus he couldn’t grant her asylum for being a citizen of that country. 
But he put great emphasis on the fact that he found her to be incredible. This fact 
hurt her quite a bit in later cases. What conclusions can be drawn when a judge 
doesn’t believe the words of the Congolese immigrant that she was raped, but 
predicts based on Western reports that she will be raped should she return? 
Subconscious biases were allowed and accepted in the courtroom. So on October 																																																								
74 In the Matter of Takky Zubeda, 2001 	
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22nd, 2001, Judge Durling denied Zubeda asylum but would allow her to stay in 
the United States (sans any rights) under the Convention against Torture. At this 
point she had been imprisoned for 10 months and a week.  
Board of Immigration Appeals 
 
 Although Zubeda remained in detention and without asylum, the INS 
were not satisfied with Judge Durling’s decision and appealed it to the Board of 
Immigration Appeals. On January 4th, 2002 they submitted a brief containing 
their arguments against the Judge, and in favor of her deportation: a “merits 
appeal”. To do so, they argued about incredibility, the conditions of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, and if prison conditions (however bad) 
actually constituted torture. First, the INS launched an attack on her credibility 
based on Judge Durling’s ruling; essentially they argued that if she had lied 
about the past then her future fears must be a lie as well. They also took the fact 
that she had not appealed Durling’s decision as an admission of guilt.  
Aside from her apparent lack of credibility, the lawyers from the INS 
argued that the respondent would not be detained in the DRC, and even if she 
was that would not amount to torture: 
The background evidence shows serious problems in the Congo’s 
[sic] human rights record, but it does not show likelihood that 
deportees are at risk of suffering the type of severe harm at the 
hands of the government that could conceivably constitute 
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“torture.” There is a dearth of evidence to support any finding that 
the respondent is likely to be detained for any reason.75 
 
They continued Judge Durling’s habit of misrepresenting the political situation 
of the DRC while speaking falsely about crucial facts about the deportation 
process. When deporting an immigrant, the INS had to ask the government of 
origin if they could return the deportee, and tell the government that they should 
detain the immigrant upon their return. This was standard procedure and can be 
seen in the forms which they sent with deported immigrants.  
Further covering every base, the INS then reexamined the meaning of 
torture so that even if the other counts were false (which they were), Zubeda’s 
future experience would not amount to torture.  
Even if she were, harsh prison conditions do not constitute 
“torture” as that term is defined. Torture requires that the harm be 
intentionally inflicted upon the victim.76 
 
Notice that the INS has redefined the issue here: instead of her fearing rape as a 
Congolese woman (particularly from the rebel held region of South Kivu) being 
detained, she becomes a trait-less immigrant fearing the potentially undesirable 
conditions of a jail cell. Returning to the Convention Against Torture, intent 
defined torture. The INS recast the intentions of Zubeda’s torturers by framing it 
as punishment and redefining Zubeda’s identity. By removing and invalidating 
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72	
the marginalized parts of her identity, they created an imagined harmless 
atmosphere for her, where her gender, race, ethnicity, and religion wouldn’t be 
cause to single her out. Sadly, this hypothetical utopia was not her reality. By 
denying her traits and the details of her situations, the lawyers feigned blindness 
to the oppression she faced due her identity and thus invalidated her experiences 
of persecution.   
 The INS’s brief rhetorically closed every door, even when it was 
contradictory. They both heavily criticized the immigration Judge’s decision 
while relying on it to label Zubeda as incredible. They characterized the DRC as a 
country that has “serious problems” with human rights, yet represented her fears 
of rape and torture as, “at best, generalized civil strife”. They argued that she 
wouldn’t be detained, but even if she were, it wouldn’t amount to torture. This 
brief demonstrated the modus operandi of the INS; the acceptable level of 
misrepresentation (to the point of lying), illogical arguments, and ignorance 
towards the basic facts of the case. These issues were not mistakes, but were 
essential to this process and completely acceptable to the asylum system. This is 
the subjectivity encouraged by the framework produced by the United Nations. 
At all levels the set of assumptions at the center of this case were accepted and 
perpetuated, because reality was disregarded in favor for something much more 
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powerful and persuasive to an overworked court: the familiar story of a 
deceptive immigrant.  
 The response brief demonstrates the strategic choices that the 
respondent’s lawyers had to make when replying to the INS. Essentially their 
argument validates the decision of Judge Durling, claiming that he made the 
correct decision and that torture was defined correctly and that CAT applied to 
Zubeda. This brief dug deep into the specificities of torture and the legal 
interpretations of the Torture convention, which in turn asked the court to 
narrow their understanding of torture.  
 To do this, the brief lays out the five characteristics of torture in the 
Convention Against Torture: 
(1) The act must cause severe physical or mental pain or suffering; (2) the 
act must be intentionally inflicted; (3) the act must be inflicted for a 
proscribed purpose; (4) the act must be inflicted by or with the consent or 
acquiescence of a public official who has custody or physical control of the 
victim; and (5) the act cannot arise from lawful sanctions.77 
 
The lawyers argued that the passage from a country conditions report of the 
DRC covers all five of those features: “The law forbids torture; however, security 
forces and prison officials used torture, and often beat prisoners in the process of 
arresting or interrogating them”.  Generally these statements reasserted the 
																																																								77	In the Matter of Takky Zubeda, 2002	
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points that Judge Durling made, and attempted to narrow the case’s effects and 
thus make it more likely to be successful.  
The most extreme example of this narrowing occurs when they 
interpreted Zubeda’s claim to torture by attempting to make her case a special 
exception. The lawyers implicitly stated that the act of raping a person does not 
constitute torture in and of itself. “Rape is categorized in international 
instruments as an act of ill- treatment rather than of torture,” they asserted. 
However, they defined Zubeda’s case as an exception due to the severe mental 
and physical trauma that could occur if she were to be raped when detained. To 
further demonstrate that this case was worthy of the torture label, the brief 
asserted several facts to assuage any doubt that the rape was potentially 
consensual. Firstly, they reasserted how the rebel soldiers who gang raped her in 
front of her family were strangers (aside from the potential connection that they 
may have been the soldiers who raped her mother days before). The basis of this 
argument was to prove the lack of consent, which had to be established because 
whether or not she knew the soldiers came up frequently through out the trials. 
Durling had found her to be untrustworthy partially because she recognized one 
of the soldiers as someone who she saw around her village occasionally. Such a 
connection became a contention of doubt, because even the slightest hint of a 
prior connection would become fodder for the INS to denigrate her. The 
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respondent’s lawyers had to have an airtight case that she was the perfect victim, 
or her life was on the line.  
 The Board of Immigration Appeals ruled to return Zubeda immediately to 
the DRC on June 7th, 2002. The basis of their decision relied on a previous case, 
that of J-E78, which found that prison conditions could be life threatening and 
indefinite but not torture. They also used Judge Durling’s finding of her 
incredibility to disprove her fears; because the burden of proof was on the 
respondent, and her testimony was a large portion of her evidence, they were 
able to dismiss her claims easily by calling her unreliable. This decision was 
significantly plagiarized from the INS’s briefs. Some parts were completely lifted 
from the text, others parts were reworded slightly. Not only does this 
demonstrate the way in which the subjective assumptions of Judge Durling were 
taken at face value, but the way in which entire chunks of the INS’s assumptions 
were literally cemented into legal rhetoric through this decision.  
 “We agree with the Service,” they begin, arguing that Zubeda does not 
qualify for the Convention Against Torture. The J-E- case was the main support 
for this argument, in that it was a BIA decision claiming that Haiti’s prisons did 
not constitute torture: 
																																																								78	In the Matter of the Application of J.E., Supreme Court, 2015  	
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In Matter of J-E-,  23 I&N Dec. 291 (BIA 2002), the Board concluded that 
the indefinite detention of criminal deportees by Haitian authorities does 
not constitute torture within the meaning of 8 C.F.R. 208. 18 (a) where 
there is no evidence that the authorities intentionally and deliberately 
detain deportees in order to inflict torture. We further held that 
substandard prison conditions in Haiti do not constitute torture within the 
meaning of 8 C.F.R. 208. 18 (a) where there is no evidence that the 
authorities create and maintain such conditions in order to inflict torture. 
Id. In addition, we found therein that evidence of the occurrence in 
Haitian prisons of isolated instances of mistreatment that may rise to the 
level of torture as defined in the Convention Against Torture is 
insufficient to establish that it is more likely than not that the respondent 
will be tortured if returned to Haiti. Based upon the facts of the instant 
case, we find dispositive our decision in Matter of J-E-, Supra.79 
 
These statements established two things in the case. First, their specific 
conclusions about Haiti could be applied to the DRC without understanding the 
specific conditions of the latter. And secondly, the BIA applied CAT not in a way 
that prevents the actual experience of torture because the intent was considered 
more important than the actual victim’s suffering. The way in which the BIA set 
up the facts to support their decision created dissonance in the way Zubeda was 
represented; she became further obscured by misinformation, but their final 
word in the matter defined her anew in the role of fallacious immigrant.  
 After presenting what they deemed to be the facts of the case, the BIA 
ultimately blamed the respondent for not providing enough evidence: 
The background evidence establishes that prison conditions in the Congo 
[sic] remain harsh and life threatening. The Immigration Judge found that 																																																								79	In the Matter of Takky Zubeda (Board of Immigration Appeals), June 7th 2002	
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the respondent would be detained upon return to the Congo (I.J. at 8). 
However, we note a dearth of evidence to support any finding that the 
respondent is likely to be detained for any reason. We find that the 
respondent has failed to establish that the harsh prison conditions 
establish a probability that she will be detained in a prison in the Congo, 
much less that she will be individually targeted for any harm by the 
government of the Congo. The evidence of record does not remotely 
establish a likelihood that the respondent will be tortured by the 
government of the Congo. While she claims to have been previously 
tortured in the Congo, the Immigration Judge specifically found her to be 
incredible and the respondent has not contested this finding (I.J. at 3-5). 
As such, the respondent has failed to meet her burden of proof. 
Accordingly, the Service’s appeal will be sustained.80 
 
This decision functioned largely as a repetition of the INS’s arguments, with clear 
indication that they did not know or were willing to ignore the specifics of 
Zubeda’s case.  
As Zubeda was fighting to stay in the United States, she was also fighting 
to get out of prison. Over email, Jonathan Feinberg discussed the case with 
Ayodelle Gansallo and Judi Bernstein-Baker, as well as two other lawyers 
working on similar cases. Zubeda had been in prison for almost two years at this 
point. She had applied twice already to be “paroled”, the legal term for being 
allowed to leave detention while awaiting deportation orders (or the unlikely 
case of her gaining withholding of removal). The INS had control of detained 
immigrants, and could decide whether or not she was a danger to United States, 
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or a “flight risk”81. If the INS continually made “rubberstamp” decisions 
(unconscious and incorrect conclusions), there was the ability that they could 
bring up the case in front of an appellate judge: an I 130 case, or Habeus 
Corpus82.  
Feinberg and two other lawyers discussed their Habeus corpus cases and 
exchanged opinions and casual advice. One of the lawyers related his experience 
with Judge Sease, a judge working in the same court as Judge Durling: 
As for our good friend Judge Sease . . . . [sic] FORGET IT!!!! I tried asking 
her, in court, for a bond hearing for an LPR [legal permanent resident] 
arriving alien (like Alaka) and she dismissed it outright. I proceeded to 
argue Alaka, Patel, Ngo and Radonic [Habeas Corpus cases] with her but 
she would not hear of it. Finally (I could not resist)  I told her: “I just find 
it interesting that in the same building (YCP) one judge would grant my 
client a bond hearing and the other will not.” She turned red, took off her 
glasses and retorted: “Mr. [redacted], Juge [sic] Durling is entitled to his 
opinion and I am entitled to mine.” I responded in closing: “I understand 
and respect that your honor. I guess I will just have to go back to Federal 
court once again to get my client released.” I thought she was gonna blow 
up!!! She said “Do what you have to do!” In the beginning, I was a bit 
intimidated by Judge Sease. Now it is kind of comical to watch her 
explode so needlessly.83  
Although the Sease’s legal opinion had to be respected, the lawyers discussed 
her (and comparatively Durling) based on her subjective interpretations of the 
law. She was considered a “bad” judge, because she was unrelenting to requests 																																																								81	Flight risk meaning an immigrant at risk of not complying with immigration law and living in 
the United States illegally.  
82 Latin for “you have the body”, Habeas Corpus is a type of case preventing wrongful or illegal 
imprisonment.   
83 Author Redacted, Personal Email to John Feinberg, 2003 
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thought to be reasonable. Even if she was considered “bad” there was not much 
the lawyers could do about her decision and it was deemed acceptable by the 
law that the two judges could have completely different conclusions which both 
must be carried out equally. Unequal application of the law demonstrates the 
incredible amounts of bias that were allowed and solidified by the system 
enough for its actors to casually discuss “good” versus “bad” judges.  
Feinberg sent multiple drafts to the HIAS (Hebrew Immigrant Aid 
Society) lawyers to make sure his arguments were persuasive; Zubeda’s release 
was becoming more desperate as her condition was worsening. Zubeda told me 
that York County prison was alright and she was giving adequate health care, 
but she had been moved to Bedford Hills Correctional Facility for Women. She 
was housed in maximum security with inmates who had committed violent 
crimes. Zubeda was afraid of some of the women who would verbally harass 
her. If guards ever came to investigate the noise, the inmates would blame 
Zubeda and she would get in trouble: the guards didn’t trust asylum seekers 
who were being detained in the prison. The conditions were much worse than 
York and her mental and physical health suffered. She was receiving some 
treatment but was still in a lot of pain as she awaited her Third Circuit trial or to 
be paroled by the INS. 
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Feinberg’s writing reflected Zubeda’s discomfort and her need to be 
released. On November 8th, 2002, Feinberg sent in a letter to Judge Schiller. His 
memorandum84 he stressed that Zubeda had spent 23 months in detention at this 
point and hadn’t been free since she stepped foot in the United States. He argued 
that although the INS has jurisdiction over the detainment of immigrants and to 
determine whether or not they pose a risk to the community or a flight risk, that 
jurisdiction was not boundless. He argued that they were neglecting their duties 
by making “boilerplate” decisions and not reading her records before making a 
decision about her parole. In his letter, Fienberg argued: 
The [INS’s argument] that Ms. Zubeda could remedy the problems with 
her application by providing a birth certificate, “specific information” 
from relatives ensuring Ms. Zubeda’s appearance at immigration 
hearings, and relevant information about Ms. Zubeda’s medical condition, 
all of which information was provided with the application, gives rise to 
the inference that the INS officials considering her application did not read 
it. Accordingly, the INS’s review of Ms. Zubeda’s parole applications does 
not, y any means, constitute the “searching periodic review” of the need 
for detention required by due process. Rather, it can only be classified as a 
‘grudging and perfunctory review’, clearly ‘not enough to satisfy the due 
process right to liberty.’ 85 
 
This letter exposes Feinberg’s frustration, which in turn demonstrates the 
assumptions he had for the way in which this system normally ran. The 
extraordinary circumstances brought on by the Patriot Act (explained below) 
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were actively changing the process of these cases, and this new conduct was 
acceptable in upper levels of the immigration system. Judge Schiller ordered that 
the INS must conduct another bond hearing of her case, without condemning or 
attempting to fix their mistakes. He allowed the INS one month to respond to the 
arguments. Schiller had sent in this decision on November 18th, so the INS had 
until December 18th to make their case. Mr. Feinberg found out the name of the 
INS lawyer assigned to Zubeda, and contacted her by phone on the 27th of 
November.  K. T. Tomlinson was somewhat unresponsive to Feinberg: he 
attempted to find out if she had planned to respond to the petition for Habeus 
Corpus and potentially talk her out of doing so; Tomlinson stated that she 
intended to respond and pointed towards a gaping hole in the case which 
normally wouldn’t have been an issue. Zubeda had been moved to several 
different prisons and thus different districts, so Judge Schiller technically didn’t 
have jurisdiction over her case any longer.  
Feinberg discussed with the other lawyers over email about why 
Tomlinson would bring up this technicality, especially because it was usually 
never considered a problem. When he inquired with Tomlinson, she had merely 
answered that the INS had overlooked that detail for other cases but that didn’t 
mean Zubeda would gain the same advantage. One lawyer working a similar 
case had a different idea however: 
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The ONLY reason they are raising this now is because they are swamped. 
In all of the habeases I filed in ED PA before, NEVER has this issue come 
up. And with the AGs [Attorney General’s] new BIA streamlining 
procedures, they better start getting used to it or hire on more Asst US 
Attorneys. 86 
But why was the system overwhelmed? During this time period, there was a 
tremendous backlog of immigration cases. In 2000, there were 125,734 cases 
pending; by 2001 that number rose to 149,338 and in 2002 it was 166,06187. More 
and more cases piled up and the average wait time for immigrants went from a 
372 days in ’98, to 528 days by ’02. This drastic change occurred largely in part to 
policy changes directly related to 9/11. 
Four days after Zubeda was denied asylum (and only six weeks after 
9/11), President George W. Bush signed the Patriot Act. This text contained ten 
articles, intended to remedy some of the issues post-9/11 and begin, as its full 
title states, “Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism”. For the Patriot Act, 
“strengthening America,” meant a more powerful government that could, at will, 
investigate, interrogate, and detain (indefinitely) the people within the United 
States borders. To achieve this, the Patriot Act: 
																																																								
86 Author Redacted, Personal Email to John Feinberg, 2003 




[…] authorized a tripling of the number of border patrol personnel, 
customs personnel, and immigration inspectors along the U.S. 
northern border, plus an addition $100 million to improve 
monitoring technology along the northern border. 88 
With more immigration enforcement officers, coupled with the rhetorical 
vilification of immigrants in United States’ cultural zeitgeist, resulted in an 
astronomical increase in detentions and deportations.89 There were no provisions 
for more judges, or lawyers to deal with the consequences of this act, which 
meant the current system was overwhelmed by wrongful imprisonment cases 
and deportation proceedings. This is all evident in Zubeda’s case. Reviewing this 
case, it becomes clear that the INS was actively trying to keep her imprisoned 
instead of allowing her a hearing to fight for her freedom. They continually 
didn’t read her documents, failed to alert her lawyers of important meetings, and 
used minute details to shut down this case at every turn.  
 The last piece of the Habeas Corpus case was Judge Schiller’s decision. In 
the end, this part of the case illuminates the role inaction has in this system, and 
how it ultimately is beneficial to it. Judge Schiller had decided that he could not 
rule over the case because it was outside of his jurisdiction. Because Zubeda had 
not been “officially” or “legally” admitted to the US, she could be detained at the 
Attorney General’s discretion: even indefinitely. The Habeas Corpus case is 																																																								88	Wendy	Biddle,	Immigrants'	Rights	After	9/11,	(New	York:	Chelsea	House,	2008).	89	Ibid.	
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crucial to understanding Zubeda’s trials because it was so intertwined with her 
immigration case: the reason she was imprisoned was purportedly her attempts 
to gain asylum, while being imprisoned could have had an effect on her 
perceived credibility due to the subconscious biases one might have against 
prisoners. Lastly, it demonstrates the bureaucratic nature of this system and how 
different branches interact with each other: the missed lines of communication 
and uneven applications of the law directly resulted in the prolonged and 
tortuous detention of Zubeda and the complete violation of her human rights, 
while she awaited protection for those rights.   
 Zubeda wasn’t released until her case went all the way back to the 
Immigration Court. The Third Circuit’s decision was to remand the case back, 
preventing her case from having any larger affects than what occurred at the BIA 
level. The Third Circuit accepted all of Judge Durling’s arguments, finding them 
to be just and a fair application of the law. This turn of events best capsulated the 
way in which the United States system functioned post 9/11: a prolonged and 
bureaucratic series of procedures which all relied on one man’s flawed 
conceptualizations of this case. This ending was depicted as joyous and just in 
tabloid articles about Zubeda’s case, but after almost four years in prison, to have 
a court decide to return the decision to the immigration judge’s decision of three 






 Over the course of this thesis I have located Zubeda’s experiences of 
persecution in the history of Democratic Republic of the Congo, in doing so 
corroborated her accounts while providing a new political lens for viewing the 
gender-based violence committed against her. I then scrutinized the texts and 
history of the United Nations documents to illuminate the rhetorical choices that 
favored the sovereign state over human rights; I then demonstrated how those 
choices work in have been cemented into the United States immigration system. 
Finally, the case itself pulls together the two prior chapters, demonstrating the 
shared set of assumptions used to come to the conclusion that Zubeda did not 
deserve asylum. This conclusion was completely in step with the asylum system, 
even though they contradict the actual history of what was happening un the 
DRC.   
 When I first contacted Zubeda, she worried about the effects that this 
project would have. “I just want a normal life,” she said on multiple occasions. 
She told me that her friends or coworkers would look her up on Google, and the 
first thing they would find would be these legal decisions (when a case goes 
through the Third Circuit, the decisions are made public), detailing her time 
spent in prison and the trauma she had experienced in detail. She was 
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profoundly hurt by the judgments people made when they found out she had 
spent four years in maximum security prison, even though it was due to her 
immigration status. The ongoing social struggles due to the handling of this case 
seem deeply unfair to her, but it is not the most disappointing part of the court’s 
outcome. Zubeda has spent the last thirteen years working several jobs a day 
while studying. She wants to be a nurse one day. Her status means she must 
frequently check in with the INS and they are allowed to frequently drop in 
without warning, a constant cause of stress. Every facet of her life has been made 
more difficult due to her lack of rights and citizenship, and her precarious status 
puts her into vulnerable situations with little recourse.  
Her story compelled me to write about it, perhaps because deep down I 
saw her as being at least close to the “perfect victim” stereotype that met the 
definition of a refugee. It surprised me to no end that this woman did not get 
asylum. In writing this, I came to realize that the sympathy I felt was forcing me 
into the logic of the asylum system: that some people deserve protection and 
should have gotten it. The deserving cannot exist without the undeserving. 
Impassioned emotional reaction is essential for the ideology behind asylum to be 
successful. Subjectivity slips past us if we agreed with the judgment. 
This is where reform of the system begins to breakdown. Non-
governmental organizations like Amnesty International use extreme or 
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extraordinary cases to make arguments; however, there is always an implicit 
other, the undeserving, in telling those stories. It is impossible to fight this 
paradigm without specifically targeting the idea that everyone deserves 
protection and it is inhumane to try and sort out humans who do not deserve it. 
Zubeda’s story is not a case I want to present as a horrific mistake, or a case that 
fell through the cracks during a politically tumultuous time period. Zubeda’s 
case is a successful representation of the system as a whole, and the way in 
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